

TECHNICAL

# Training and Empowering Grassroots Leadership for Post-Conflict Reconstruction in Sudan

**El-Hadi Hunud Abia Kadouf**

*Independent Researcher and Leadership Development Consultant, France*

Email: kadouf@gmail.com

ORCID: 0009-0004-6297-035X

## ABSTRACT

**PURPOSE:** To explore how targeted grassroots leadership training can support sustainable post-conflict reconstruction in Sudan.

**DESIGN/METHODOLOGY/APPROACH:** Qualitative synthesis of literature, comparative case analysis, and insights from the author's Grassroots Leadership Development Programme.

**FINDINGS:** Structured, locally led leadership development enhances conflict mediation, resilience, and inclusive recovery, directly supporting Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) 4, 8, 10, 11, and 16.

**ORIGINALITY/VALUE:** Offers an actionable, scalable model rooted in Sudanese realities and international best practice, focused on empowering local actors.

**PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS:** Provides policy-makers and practitioners with a roadmap for designing effective grassroots capacity-building programmes in Sudan and similar contexts.

**KEYWORDS:** *Grassroots Leadership; Post-Conflict Reconstruction; Sudan; Capacity Building; Sustainable Development Goals; Community Empowerment.*

**CITATION:** Kadouf, E.-H.H.A. (2025): Training and Empowering Grassroots Leadership for Post-Conflict Reconstruction in Sudan. In Ahmed, A. (Ed.): *International Journal of Innovation and Knowledge Management in Middle East and North Africa*, Vol. 10, No. 1/2, pp. 65–80

**RECEIVED:** 8 May 2025 / **REVISED:** 27 June 2025 / **ACCEPTED:** 30 June 2025 / **PUBLISHED:** 7 July 2025

**COPYRIGHT:** © 2025 by all the authors of the article above. The article is published as an open access article by WASD under the terms and conditions of the Creative Commons Attribution (CC BY) license (<https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/>).

## INTRODUCTION

Rebuilding Sudan after the civil war demands more than repairing infrastructure or reforming institutions; it calls for a fundamental transformation in how leadership is understood, developed, and distributed. The crisis that erupted in April 2023 deepened existing political fragility, economic deterioration, and societal fragmentation. These conditions reflect long-standing structural challenges, including flawed peace processes and elite-dominated governance that have consistently failed to yield inclusive and sustainable outcomes (Makonye, 2023).

Post-conflict recovery efforts frequently falter when driven by top-down approaches that exclude local perspectives. A growing body of evidence in international development shows that sustainable peace is most effectively achieved when local communities play an active role in shaping their own futures (Barakat and Waldman, 2013). In Sudan, this means investing in the leadership capacities of youth, women, traditional authorities, community organisers, and local Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs), those who have sustained community cohesion during conflict and uncertainty (Leonard and Samantar, 2011).

The 2023 conflict between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) has affected both urban centres and rural regions, disrupting key institutions and displacing millions. It also underscored the limits of centralised governance and revealed the urgency of inclusive, community-driven reconstruction (Chandler, 2006).

Grassroots leadership is especially critical in light of Sudan's complex social fabric, marked by tribal affiliations, religious diversity, regional disparities, and generational divides. While top-down models have repeatedly imposed standardised policies that fail to reflect local realities, grassroots leaders are deeply embedded in their communities. They possess cultural competence, historical legitimacy, and the trust needed to mediate conflicts and foster resilience. In many cases, their presence during periods of state collapse has helped prevent total societal breakdown (Chambers, 1983).

This paper argues for a structured, contextually grounded approach to grassroots leadership development as a cornerstone of Sudan's recovery. Drawing on interdisciplinary scholarship, international case studies, and the author's direct experience designing the Grassroots Leadership Development Programme (GLDP), it outlines a framework for equipping local leaders with the skills and confidence to rebuild from the ground up.

It also positions grassroots leadership not as a secondary feature of peacebuilding, but as its foundation, a primary mechanism for achieving sustainable peace, inclusive development, and locally anchored governance (Paffenholz, 2015). The GLDP is presented as both a practical strategy and a paradigm shift: one that replaces top-down dependency with local empowerment, and positions Sudanese communities as active agents in their own transformation.

## RATIONALE: THE CASE FOR GRASSROOTS LEADERSHIP

Post-conflict reconstruction in Sudan has long been hindered by centralised, elite-driven approaches that overlook the agency, legitimacy, and insights of local communities (Assal, 2004; Berridge, 2023). These top-down strategies, often shaped by donor priorities and technocratic planning, have consistently failed to deliver sustainable peace or inclusive development (Chandler, 2006).

Comparative evidence from other post-conflict contexts reveals a similar pattern. In the Democratic Republic of Congo and Angola, large-scale post-war investments did not translate into meaningful development due to weak local ownership and the exclusion of informal institutions. Sudan risks repeating this trajectory unless grassroots leadership becomes central to its recovery framework (Autesserre, 2010; Chandler, 2006).

Political economy perspectives help explain this failure. Empowered local actors can threaten entrenched elite interests by demanding accountability and disrupting patronage systems. As Acemoglu and Robinson (2012) argue, inclusive institutions are often resisted by those who benefit from extractive ones. Therefore, strengthening grassroots leadership is not just a development imperative, it is a political act of redistribution and rebalancing power.

By contrast, community-rooted leadership offers a powerful alternative. Grassroots leaders, such as youth activists, traditional chiefs, women's group organisers, religious figures, and heads of local NGOs, emerge organically from within communities. They are not defined by formal state authority, but by proximity, trust, and cultural embeddedness (Leonard and Samantar, 2011; Zanker, 2013). These leaders manage local conflicts, mobilise resources, and build resilience in ways that are deeply aligned with local needs and values.

International experiences reinforce this. In Rwanda and Liberia, local leaders played key roles in reconciliation, service delivery, and community rebuilding (Richmond and Mac Ginty, 2015). When equipped with the right tools and support, they can bridge humanitarian relief with long-term development planning.

In Sudan, the relevance of grassroots leadership is evident both in history and in recent civic movements. The native administration system, despite its limitations, continues to be central to land governance and conflict mediation in many rural areas (Young, 2005). Meanwhile, the 2019 revolution showcased the organisational strength of youth and women's movements; these groups mobilised under severe repression to demand democratic reform (Engeler *et al.*, 2020).

As Young (2005) has noted, Sudan's governance structures have historically marginalised peripheral regions, reinforcing exclusion through elite bargains. Grassroots leadership development is not merely beneficial, it is essential to correcting this imbalance and enabling a just, locally led recovery. Kadouf (2001) highlights how historical marginalisation of peripheral communities, such as the Nuba, has been a persistent feature of Sudan's governance structure, making grassroots leadership essential for any meaningful post-conflict recovery.

Moreover, empowering grassroots leadership directly supports several key Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs):

- SDG 4 – Quality Education and capacity building;
- SDG 8 – Decent Work and Economic Growth;
- SDG 10 – Reduced Inequalities;
- SDG 11 – Sustainable Cities and Communities;
- SDG 16 – Peace, Justice and Strong Institutions.

By focusing on locally adapted and inclusive leadership, Sudan can move from fragile peace to sustainable, people-driven transformation.

## THE GRASSROOTS LEADERSHIP DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME (GLDP)

Born from grassroots consultations and rooted in Sudanese traditions of collective leadership, the GLDP embodies a community-first philosophy. While it aligns with continental strategies such as the African Union’s Post Conflict Reconstruction and Development (PCRD) framework, its design reflects local realities, not imposed models. It was originally scheduled for launch in mid-2024 but was postponed due to the escalation of conflict. Nonetheless, the model remains ready to be adapted and scaled once implementation conditions stabilise.

The programme is structured into four core phases, needs assessment, foundational training, applied leadership, and cascading advocacy, supported by flexible delivery models and contextual sensitivity. Each phase builds towards long-term community ownership of leadership development and peacebuilding.

### Conflict-Sensitive Needs Assessment

The programme begins with a participatory needs assessment led by local facilitators. Trainees engage with their communities to identify priority issues, ranging from displacement and food insecurity to land disputes and social exclusion. The methodology emphasises conflict sensitivity and mapping of power dynamics to avoid unintentionally exacerbating local tensions.

Echoing de Waal’s (1997) critique of “humanitarianism from above”, which criticised externally imposed aid for undermining local agency, this phase ensures that leadership development starts with local voice and lived experience. Community response maps and dialogue circles help facilitators design grounded interventions.

### Foundational Leadership Training

Participants undergo intensive training covering:

- emotional intelligence and self-awareness;
- conflict resolution and community mediation;
- inclusive decision-making;
- participatory project planning;
- ethical leadership and resilience.

Training is informed by Knowles *et al.* (2015) on adult learning, Freire (1970) on critical consciousness, and Mezirow (1997) on transformative reflection. Local proverbs, storytelling, and peer facilitation methods ensure relevance and relatability. Sessions are trauma-informed and designed to accommodate varying literacy levels and learning styles.

## Community-Led Pilot Projects

Following the training, each participant or cohort implements a community-based initiative tied to the priorities identified in the initial phase. These include literacy circles, food distribution networks, women's safety coalitions, and youth employment hubs. Projects are designed to be low-cost, high-impact, and scalable.

Each project is aligned with at least one of the following SDGs:

- SDG 4 – Quality Education (e.g., literacy initiatives);
- SDG 8 – Decent Work and Economic Growth (e.g., vocational skills);
- SDG 10 – Reduced Inequalities (e.g., women's inclusion);
- SDG 11 – Sustainable Cities and Communities (e.g., urban youth initiatives);
- SDG 16 – Peace, Justice and Strong Institutions (e.g., community mediation),

By embedding development into leadership practice, this phase builds confidence, accountability, and visibility for grassroots actors.

## Strategic Advocacy and Knowledge Cascading

Leaders are equipped with tools for policy engagement and community-based advocacy. They learn to:

- write proposals and issue briefs;
- engage with local councils and ministries;
- mobilise coalitions and alliances;
- use radio, social media, and storytelling for influence,

Each graduate trains a cohort of peers, creating cascading impact. This peer-led diffusion ensures the programme expands organically, while honouring cultural and contextual differences.

## Alignment with the UN's SDGs

The GLDP contributes directly to several global development goals:

- SDG 4 by increasing community-level access to education and leadership training;
- SDG 8 by fostering entrepreneurship and livelihood initiatives;
- SDG 10 through inclusion of women, youth, and marginalised ethnic groups;
- SDG 11 via urban/rural community engagement and cohesion;
- SDG 16 by nurturing conflict resolution and justice mechanisms at the grassroots level.

Its strategic framing helps attract donor support and aligns with national SDG reporting structures.

## Flexibility and Cultural Sensitivity

The GLDP is adaptable to Sudan's social and geographic diversity. In the Nuba Mountains, it supports traditional leaders in conflict mediation while empowering youth with participatory leadership tools. In Darfur and Eastern Sudan, it incorporates trauma healing and women's civic engagement. In the Blue Nile, where ethnic pluralism, under-development, and political volatility intersect, the programme supports dialogue forums and local peace agreements to help communities rebuild trust and advocate for equity.

In urban areas such as Khartoum's informal settlements, the model embraces digital literacy and inter-ethnic collaboration. All modules are delivered in Arabic and as many widely spoken Sudanese languages as possible.

As de Waal (2009) argues, effective peacebuilding must accommodate political complexity and informal authority systems, something the GLDP embeds in its modular, community-rooted design.

### *Case Example: Jofor from South Kordofan*

One illustrative case is Jofor, a displaced former teacher from South Kordofan who joined the GLDP prototype during its early pilot phase. His village had been devastated by conflict, and he was living in a makeshift camp with limited access to services. Despite these challenges, Jofor remained committed to helping his community recover and rebuild.

During his GLDP training, Jofor learned core leadership competencies including trauma-sensitive facilitation, participatory planning, conflict resolution, and community mobilisation. He also developed a strong sense of self-leadership and purpose, drawing on modules in emotional intelligence, resilience, and inclusive decision-making. Peer learning sessions and reflective journaling helped him process his own experiences of displacement and rediscover his role as a change agent.

After the training, Jofor returned to his settlement determined to address the educational gap facing displaced youth. Many children had been out of school for two or more years, and there were no functioning schools in the area. Using the skills acquired in the programme, Jofor conducted a community needs assessment through informal meetings, story circles, and household visits. Literacy and psychosocial support emerged as top priorities.

With community input, Jofor identified an abandoned mosque on the edge of the camp and negotiated with elders for its temporary use as a classroom. He mobilised five volunteer educators, mostly other displaced teachers and literate youth, and designed a flexible, culturally relevant curriculum that blended Arabic reading and writing with storytelling, numeracy, and games. Inspired by the GLDP's trauma-informed approach, he built time into the programme for check-ins, trust-building activities, and expressive arts, especially for children coping with loss or anxiety.

Word of the initiative spread quickly. Within a few weeks, over 60 children aged 10 to 18 had enrolled. Jofor implemented rotating schedules to accommodate different age groups and

family responsibilities. Parents noted that their children were more confident, co-operative, and hopeful. Elders reported a visible reduction in social tensions, especially between different ethnic communities that had been previously divided by fear and mistrust.

Six months into the project, neighbouring settlements reached out to Jofor for advice on starting similar programmes. With the support of his volunteer team, he helped two communities launch their own learning centres using adapted versions of his curriculum. He also began mentoring younger community members, building a local leadership pipeline in line with the GLDP's cascading model.

Jofor's story illustrates the transformational power of grassroots leadership development. Through a context-sensitive, culturally grounded, and trauma-aware approach, the GLDP helped him unlock his potential, not just as a teacher, but as a connector, facilitator, and visionary. His work continues to grow, not through formal authority or donor projects, but through trust, initiative, and a commitment to rebuilding from within.

## **PEDAGOGICAL APPROACH: BUILDING CAPACITY FROM THE GROUND UP**

The GLDP is grounded in a pedagogical framework that prioritises transformation over transmission. Drawing from adult learning theory, trauma-informed facilitation, and behavioural science, the programme cultivates not only knowledge and skills, but the mindsets and values required for effective community leadership in a post-conflict context.

At the heart of the programme is a participatory, learner-centred model inspired by Paulo Freire's (1970) *Pedagogy of the Oppressed*. Trainees are seen not as passive recipients of information, but as co-creators of knowledge whose lived experiences form the foundation for learning. This approach fosters dignity, critical consciousness, and ownership, three qualities often eroded in conflict-affected settings.

The GLDP also integrates Mezirow's (1997) theory of transformative learning. Participants engage in structured storytelling, guided journaling, and peer dialogue to reflect on personal and collective experiences. These exercises help leaders unlearn limiting narratives and step into more constructive, purpose-driven leadership identities. In line with Kolb's (1984) experiential learning model, the GLDP encourages participants to learn by doing, applying new insights in real-time and refining their approach through cycles of action and reflection.

Knowles *et al.*'s (2015) principles of adult education further shape the curriculum's structure. Learning is designed to be self-directed, problem-centred, and immediately applicable to community realities. Modules respond to real challenges, such as inter-communal violence, youth mobilisation, and inclusive planning, ensuring that theory is always connected to action.

Crucially, the GLDP is delivered through a trauma-informed lens. Facilitators are trained to create psychologically safe spaces where participants can process distress, build resilience, and restore trust. Practices include check-ins, narrative healing, and adaptive content pacing. These elements are critical in Sudan's context, where many participants have lived through displacement, violence, or loss (Anderson and Olson, 2003).

Cultural adaptation is another core strength. Workshops are delivered in Arabic and as many of Sudan's widely spoken languages as possible. Content is tailored to local customs, religious values, and oral traditions. Stories, metaphors, and rituals from within each community are embedded into training to strengthen relevance and resonance.

An embedded feedback cycle ensures that the programme remains dynamic and learner-responsive. Participants complete reflective logs, community response maps, and module evaluations that inform real-time adaptations and future curriculum iterations. This iterative model ensures that GLDP grows with the communities it serves.

Ultimately, the GLDP's pedagogy is about unlocking leadership from within. It supports a shift from passive dependency to proactive agency, from trauma to trust, and from silence to voice. This inner transformation reflects the principles of emotional intelligence as central to effective leadership (Goleman *et al.*, 2013). In doing so, it lays the foundation for a leadership culture that is both resilient and rooted in Sudan's diverse and evolving realities.

## COMPARATIVE INSIGHTS FROM OTHER POST-CONFLICT STATES

Post-conflict reconstruction efforts around the world provide valuable lessons for Sudan, particularly on the role of grassroots leadership in rebuilding trust, restoring services, and sustaining peace. Experiences from Rwanda, Liberia, South Sudan, Timor-Leste, and Nepal illustrate both the promise and pitfalls of community-led approaches.

In Rwanda, the Gacaca court system demonstrated how decentralised, culturally grounded justice mechanisms can support reconciliation. These community-based courts allowed citizens to participate in transitional justice processes, enhancing legitimacy and rebuilding social cohesion (Clark, 2010). Similarly, the principle of *umuganda*, a tradition of monthly community service, was institutionalised to promote civic responsibility and local development. While the Gacaca model was not without criticism, particularly around state control, it remains a compelling example of grassroots mobilisation in fragile settings.

In Liberia, post-war recovery was strengthened by local Peace Committees supported by NGOs and the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL). These committees created safe spaces for dialogue, helped mediate land disputes, and facilitated reintegration of ex-combatants. Traditional leaders, women, and youth were actively involved, increasing community ownership and adaptability (Sawyer, 2005; van Tongeren, 2011).

In contrast, South Sudan offers a cautionary tale. Despite high hopes following independence in 2011, peacebuilding efforts remained highly centralised and elite-driven. As de Waal (2014) notes, the exclusion of grassroots actors led to renewed conflict, eroded social trust, and missed opportunities for inclusive development. Local women's groups, chiefs, and youth leaders were largely side-lined, weakening the very networks needed for long-term stability.

From Timor-Leste, the example of legally recognised *suco* councils, village-level governance bodies, shows the power of embedding community leadership in national frameworks. These



councils managed funds, resolved disputes, and co-ordinated development initiatives (Autesserre, 2010). Likewise, in Nepal, the integration of former Maoist combatants into local governance structures following the peace agreement helped promote inclusion and reduce polarisation.

From these diverse contexts, several actionable lessons emerge:

**Institutionalise local participation:** Formal recognition of grassroots leaders enhances legitimacy, strengthens co-ordination, and ensures policy responsiveness.

**Invest in leadership capacity:** Sustainable peace requires ongoing training, mentorship, and funding for local leaders.

**Support hybrid justice systems:** Culturally rooted dispute resolution mechanisms can complement state structures.

**Create multi-stakeholder platforms:** Linking government, civil society, and communities enables co-ownership and reduces conflict.

**Balance autonomy with integration:** Local leadership should retain flexibility while being meaningfully connected to national policy frameworks.

These lessons directly inform the design of the GLDP. The programme avoids the pitfalls of elite-centric approaches by embedding training within local realities. It draws on the successes of participatory models to build inclusive, resilient leadership structures. Above all, it recognises that sustainable recovery in Sudan will not come from international blueprints or political negotiations alone, but from within the communities who have already begun rebuilding.

## IMPLEMENTATION CHALLENGES IN SUDAN

While the GLDP presents a promising model for locally driven peacebuilding, its success depends on navigating a complex landscape of political, infrastructural, cultural, and institutional challenges. Recognising and proactively addressing these barriers is essential to ensuring the programme's relevance, resilience, and scalability.

### Political Instability and Elite Resistance

Sudan's volatile political environment remains a primary threat to grassroots initiatives. Empowering community-based actors may be viewed by elites as a challenge to central authority and patronage systems. Building inclusive leadership systems often disrupts entrenched political arrangements and is likely to meet resistance from actors who benefit from centralised power structures (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2012). This challenge is compounded by development assistance models that often avoid engaging with political structures. Carothers and de Gramont (2013) note that such avoidance undermines the very reforms aid intends to support. Without strong political backing and legal protection for civic space, GLDP-trained leaders may be co-opted, marginalised, or exposed to risk.

## Infrastructure and Delivery Gaps

Even when grassroots leaders are identified and trained, the physical and technological infrastructure required to deliver and sustain programming can be lacking. Remote and conflict-affected areas may face delays in implementation due to lack of roads, digital access, and communication infrastructure, limitations echoed in findings from South Sudan (De’Nyok, 2025).

In such environments, training centres may not be easily accessible, and mobile learning platforms, although promising, require stable electricity, the Internet, and digital literacy, which are not uniformly available across all regions. Without proactive investment in infrastructure and accessibility planning, the GLDP risks reinforcing existing inequalities between urban and rural communities.

## Urban Bias and Geographic Inequality

Development programmes in Sudan have historically focused on urban centres, often excluding rural and peripheral regions. As Berridge (2023) highlights, systemic marginalisation in areas such as Darfur, the Nuba Mountains, the Blue Nile, and Eastern Sudan has deep colonial and postcolonial roots. If the GLDP is not explicitly decentralised, it risks replicating this imbalance by concentrating resources in more accessible locations.

## Cultural and Linguistic Diversity

Sudan’s immense cultural diversity is both a strength and a logistical challenge. Training content must reflect regional norms, be delivered in appropriate languages, and acknowledge local conflict histories. A standardised model would fall short. Instead, the GLDP must rely on locally grounded facilitators and adaptive content development to ensure cultural resonance and accessibility.

## Weak Institutional Linkages

Grassroots leaders often operate outside of formal governance structures. While their social legitimacy is strong, their ability to influence policy remains limited. For the GLDP to have lasting impact, mechanisms must be established to connect trained leaders with local councils, state ministries, and national platforms. Without these linkages, community leadership risks remaining isolated and symbolic.

## Psychological Trauma and Leadership Fatigue

Years of conflict, displacement, and uncertainty have taken a toll on community resilience. Many potential leaders experience burnout, unresolved trauma, or loss of hope. While the GLDP includes trauma-informed practices, additional psychosocial support and ongoing mentorship may be needed to sustain engagement. Leadership development must prioritise emotional well-being alongside technical competence (Miller and Rasmussen, 2010).

## Funding and Resource Constraints

Sustaining the GLDP requires more than seed funding. Long-term, multi-year financing is essential to support iterative learning, programme scaling, and continuity. Reliance on short-term donor cycles risks stalling progress and undermining local trust. Blended funding models, including diaspora remittances, local government contributions, and community co-investment, should be explored to diversify and stabilise the resource base.

## Monitoring and Evaluation Gaps

Evaluating leadership programmes in fragile contexts is challenging. Quantitative metrics often fail to capture behavioural change or social impact. Yet without robust monitoring, the GLDP cannot learn, adapt, or prove its value. Investing in participatory evaluation, through community scorecards, reflective journals, and narrative case studies, can generate more relevant data while reinforcing learning (Church and Rogers, 2006).

## STRATEGIC OPPORTUNITIES AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

Despite Sudan's daunting post-conflict landscape, numerous strategic opportunities exist to support the successful implementation of the GLDP and maximise its long-term impact. These opportunities hinge on building alliances, institutionalising the programme, and strengthening its integration within broader peacebuilding and development frameworks.

### Leverage Diaspora Networks

Sudan's globally dispersed diaspora is a vital but under-utilised resource. Many Sudanese professionals abroad possess the technical skills, financial capacity, and political commitment to support grassroots initiatives. Engaging diaspora actors through mentorship programmes, resource mobilisation, and advocacy coalitions can significantly enhance the GLDP's reach and sustainability (van Hear, 2014).

### Institutionalise the GLDP in National Frameworks

For long-term relevance, the GLDP should be embedded within Sudan's peacebuilding architecture and decentralisation policies. This can be achieved by aligning the programme with national development plans, Ministry of Education and Local Government frameworks, and the African Union's Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development (PCRD) policy (AU, 2006). Institutionalisation provides legitimacy, protects against political volatility, and opens up access to state resources. Formal integration into national policy frameworks not only enhances legitimacy but also helps protect the programme from political interference during periods of instability.

## Partner with Local Universities and NGOs

Collaborations with Sudanese universities, teacher training institutes, and community-based organisations can help localise training content and delivery. As Edwards (2014) argues, a vibrant civil society plays a critical role in enabling inclusive governance and bridging the gap between citizens and institutions, an insight that underpins the GLDP's strategy of partnering with local academic and community actors. These partnerships enhance credibility and ensure that the GLDP remains culturally grounded and academically rigorous. Universities can also support monitoring and evaluation efforts by conducting impact assessments and facilitating action research.

## Develop Leadership Cascading and Certification Models

To ensure scalability, the GLDP should formalise a cascading leadership model in which trained leaders are empowered to mentor new cohorts. Certification systems, administered in partnership with academic institutions, can help standardise competencies, increase participant motivation, and create recognised pathways for civic leadership. As Perlman Robinson *et al.* (2020) emphasise in their work on real-time scaling, effective leadership development must be grounded in evidence, tested in diverse settings, and adapted iteratively, principles that the GLDP integrates into its cascading and certification strategy. Regular peer review workshops and third-party evaluations can ensure quality and consistency across cascading cohorts.

## Align the GLDP with the UNSDGs

As discussed earlier, the GLDP supports several key UN SDGs, particularly SDG 4 (Quality Education), SDG 8 (Decent Work), SDG 10 (Reduced Inequalities), SDG 11 (Sustainable Cities and Communities), and SDG 16 (Peace, Justice, and Strong Institutions). Explicitly aligning project outcomes with these global goals not only enhances impact measurement but also increases eligibility for international funding and recognition.

## Expand Digital Access and Learning

Given the increasing penetration of mobile technology in Sudan, digital learning platforms can supplement in-person workshops. Mobile applications, radio broadcasts, and SMS-based curricula can reach remote communities and expand access to leadership development content, particularly among women and youth with limited mobility. Tools such as WhatsApp-based learning groups and solar-powered radio broadcasts have proven effective in similar low-resource environments and can be adapted for Sudan's context (Trucano, 2016). These tools must also be designed to accommodate low literacy levels and be accessible on basic mobile devices.

## Promote Inclusive Recruitment and Intersectional Design

Recruitment strategies must be intentionally inclusive, prioritising participants across gender, age, ethnic, religious, and linguistic lines. Special efforts should be made to include individuals with disabilities and internally displaced persons. Programme content must also reflect intersectional analysis, for example, how gender, displacement, disability, and regional identity interact to shape leadership access and experience. Recruitment should be guided by local consultation to reflect community-identified inclusion priorities and avoid tokenism.

## Secure Multi-Year and Flexible Funding

To ensure the sustainability and responsiveness of the GLDP, a diversified funding strategy is essential. Effective implementation depends on predictable and flexible financing. Blended funding models, combining donor support, local government allocations, diaspora contributions, and NGO co-funding, can reduce dependence on any one source. Flexibility is essential for adapting to shifting conflict dynamics and scaling in response to demand. Where appropriate, outcome-based funding models may be piloted to attract impact investors and donors seeking measurable community-level results.

## CONCLUSIONS: REBUILDING SUDAN FROM THE GROUND UP

Rebuilding Sudan in the aftermath of civil war demands more than restoring institutions or rebuilding infrastructure, it requires reimagining leadership from the ground up. As this paper has argued, grassroots leadership must form the foundation of any strategy for peace, inclusion, and long-term development.

The Grassroots Leadership Development Programme (GLDP) offers a context-sensitive, culturally grounded model for this transformation. It positions community members not as passive recipients of aid or policy, but as active agents of change, leaders who can mediate conflict, drive development, and rebuild social trust from the ground up.

The GLDP's flexibility allows it to adapt across Sudan's diverse landscape, from the most remote rural regions to the informal settlements surrounding major cities. Its focus on emotional intelligence, community collaboration, and system-level advocacy reflects the multi-dimensional nature of post-conflict leadership. By integrating trauma-informed practices, participatory learning, and cascading mentorship, the programme not only transfers skills but nurtures resilience, purpose, and agency.

Lessons from countries such as Rwanda, Liberia, and South Sudan underscore the risks of excluding local actors from recovery efforts, and the power of structured grassroots engagement when properly supported. The GLDP builds on these insights to offer a Sudan-specific response to governance vacuums, fragmentation, and marginalisation.

However, this vision cannot be realised without addressing implementation risks: political resistance, trauma, exclusion, and resource instability. The paper has outlined these challenges and offered pathways to overcome them, through diaspora partnerships, institutional integration, inclusive design, and blended financing.

Looking forward, the next step is to pilot the GLDP in transitional and conflict-affected regions, gather evidence, and refine the model for broader scale-up. If implemented effectively, the GLDP can become a scalable model not only for Sudan, but for other fragile states seeking inclusive recovery through local leadership. Sudan's future hinges on a leadership culture rooted not in coercion or patronage, but in empowerment, integrity, and grassroots legitimacy. Only through such a shift can Sudan lay strong foundations for a peaceful and inclusive future.

The future of Sudan lies not in imported blueprints, but in the everyday leadership of its people, steadfast, resilient, and ready to lead from the ground up.

## REFERENCES

- Acemoglu, D. and Robinson, J.A. (2012): *Why nations fail: The origins of power, prosperity, and poverty*. Crown Publishing Group.
- AfricanUnion(AU)(2006):*Policyframeworkforpost-conflict reconstructionanddevelopment(PCRD)*.Available at: <https://au.int/en/documents/20060707/policy-framework-post-conflict-reconstruction-and-development>
- Anderson, M.B. and Olson, L. (2003): *Confronting war: Critical lessons for peace practitioners*. Cambridge, MA: The Collaborative for Development Action.
- Assal, M.A. (2004): *Sticky labels or rich ambiguities? Diaspora and challenges of homemaking for Somalis and Sudanese in Norway*. Centre of Development Studies, University of Bergen.
- Autesserre, S. (2010): *The trouble with the Congo: Local violence and the failure of international peacebuilding*. Cambridge University Press. Available at: <https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511761034>
- Barakat, S. and Waldman, T. (2013): Conflict analysis for the post-conflict reconstruction context. *Conflict, Security & Development*, Vol. 13, No. 3, pp.259-283. Available at: <https://doi.org/10.1080/14678802.2013.811048>
- Berridge, W. (2023): Western Sudanese marginalization, coups in Khartoum and the structural legacies of colonial military divide and rule, 1924-present. *Journal of Eastern African Studies*, Vol. 17, No. 4, pp.535-556. Available at: <https://doi.org/10.1080/17531055.2023.2280933>
- Carothers, T. and de Gramont, D. (2013): *Development aid confronts politics: The almost revolution*. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
- Chambers, R. (1983): *Rural development: Putting the last first*. Longman.
- Chandler, D.C. (2006): *Empire in denial: The politics of state-building*. Pluto Press.
- Church, C. and Rogers, M.M. (2006): *Designing for Results: Integrating Monitoring and Evaluation in Conflict Transformation Programs*. Search for Common Ground.
- Clark, P. (2010): *The Gacaca courts, post-genocide justice and reconciliation in Rwanda: Justice without lawyers*. Cambridge University Press. Available at: <https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511761584>

- de Waal, A. (1997): *Famine crimes: Politics and the disaster relief industry in Africa*. African Rights and Indiana University Press.
- de Waal, A. (2009): Mission without End? Peacekeeping in the African Political Marketplace. *International Affairs*, Vol. 85, No. 1, pp.99-113. Available at: <http://www.jstor.org/stable/27694922>
- de Waal, A. (2014): When kleptocracy becomes insolvent: Brute causes of the civil war in South Sudan. *African Affairs*, Vol. 113, No. 452, pp.347-369. Available at: <https://doi.org/10.1093/afraf/adu028>
- De'Nyok, M.E. (2025): The impacts of state instability on services delivery in post-conflict South Sudan. *Open Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 15, No. 1, pp.146-187. Available at: <https://doi.org/10.4236/ojps.2024.141001>
- Edwards, M. (2014): *Civil society* (3rd edn). Polity Press.
- Engeler, M., Braghieri, E. and Manzur, S. (2020): White Teyab, Pink Kandakat: Gender and the 2018-2019 Sudanese Revolution. *Journal of Public and International Affairs*,. Available at: <https://jpia.princeton.edu/news/white-teyab-pink-kandakat-gender-and-2018-2019-sudanese-revolution>
- Freire, P. (1970): *Pedagogy of the Oppressed*. Herder and Herder.
- Goleman, D., Boyatzis, R. and McKee, A. (2013): *Primal leadership: Unleashing the power of emotional intelligence* (Rev. edn). Harvard Business Review Press.
- Kadouf, H.A. (2001): Marginalization and resistance: The plight of the Nuba people. *New Political Science*, Vol. 23, No. 1, pp.45-63. Available at: <https://doi.org/10.1080/07393140120030331>
- Knowles, M.S., Holton III, E.F. and Swanson, R.A. (2015): *The adult learner: The definitive classic in adult education and human resource development* (8th edn). Routledge. Available at: <https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315816951>
- Kolb, D.A. (1984): *Experiential learning: Experience as the source of learning and development*. Prentice Hall.
- Leonard, D.K. and Samantar, M.S. (2011): What does the Somali experience teach us about the social contract and the state? *Development and Change*, Vol. 42, No. 2, pp.559-584. Available at: <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-7660.2011.01702.x>
- Makonye, F. (2023): Political reflections on the Sudanese civil war 2023: A qualitative study. *African Journal of Peace and Conflict Studies*, Vol. 12, No. 3, p.71. Available at: <https://doi.org/10.31920/2634-3665/2023/v12n3a4>
- Mezirow, J. (1997): Transformative learning: Theory to practice. *New Directions for Adult and Continuing Education*, Vol. 1997, No. 74, pp.5-12. Available at: <https://doi.org/10.1002/ace.7401>
- Miller, K.E. and Rasmussen, A. (2010): War exposure, daily stressors, and mental health in conflict and post-conflict settings: Bridging the divide between trauma-focused and psychosocial frameworks. *Social Science & Medicine*, Vol. 70, No. 1, pp.7-16. Available at: <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.socscimed.2009.09.029>
- Paffenholz, T. (2015): Unpacking the local turn in peacebuilding: A critical assessment towards an agenda for future research. *Third World Quarterly*, Vol. 36, No. 5, pp.857-874. Available at: <https://doi.org/10.1080/01436597.2015.1029908>

- Perlman Robinson, J., Custiss Wyss, M. and Hannahan, P. (2020): *Millions learning: The Real-Time Scaling Labs – Emerging findings and key insights*. Brookings Institution. Available at: <https://www.brookings.edu/articles/millions-learning-real-time-scaling-labs-emerging-findings-and-key-insights/>
- Richmond, O.P. and Mac Ginty, R. (2015): Where now for the critique of the liberal peace? *Cooperation and Conflict*, Vol. 50, No. 2, pp.171-189. Available at: <http://www.jstor.org/stable/45084348>
- Sawyer, A. (2005): *Beyond plunder: Toward democratic governance in Liberia*. Lynne Rienner Publishers.
- Trucano, M. (2016): *Technologies in Education Across the Americas: The Promise and the Peril – and Some Potential Ways Forward*. World Bank. Available at: <https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/server/api/core/bitstreams/f4c76591-7f69-5b59-939a-60495b37d873/content>
- Hear, N. (2014): Refugees, diasporas and transnationalism. In Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, E., Loescher, G., Long, K. and Sigona, N. (Eds): *The Oxford Handbook of Refugee and Forced Migration Studies* (pp.176-187). Oxford University Press: Oxford.
- van Tongeren, P. (2011): Increasing interest in locally led peacebuilding. *Journal of Conflictology*, Vol. 2, No. 2. Available at: [https://journal-of-conflictology.uoc.edu/joc/en/index.php/journal-of-conflictology/article/view/vol2iss2-van\\_tongeren.html](https://journal-of-conflictology.uoc.edu/joc/en/index.php/journal-of-conflictology/article/view/vol2iss2-van_tongeren.html)
- Young, J. (2005): Sudan: A flawed peace process leading to a flawed peace. *Review of African Political Economy*, Vol. 32, No. 103, pp.99-113. Available at: <https://doi.org/10.1080/03056240500121008>
- Zanker, F. (2013): Legitimate representation in mediation processes: Civil society involvement in Liberia and Kenya. *Mediation Arguments*, Vol. No. 1, pp.1-20.

## BIOGRAPHY



**El-Hadi Kadouf** is an experienced leadership development consultant with nearly two decades of expertise in learning and development. He is the creator of the LEAD™ Framework that uses principles of behavioural science to help leaders enhance self-awareness, ownership, adaptability, and purpose. El-Hadi has worked across three continents, consulting for major organisations and governments. He focuses on developing effective leadership strategies that drive organisational performance and personal growth. Passionate about supporting leaders in complex environments, including post-conflict settings, El-Hadi fosters resilience and sustainable change. He regularly shares insights on leadership development, behavioural change, and resilience through his writings.

